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1.  Introduction 
Low-wage employment has increasingly become a focus for policymakers in 
Europe.  Against a background of widening earnings and income inequality since the 
late 1970s, it has been recognised that a substantial proportion of those in poverty are 
in  employment  but  earning  low  wages.    Bardone  and  Guio  (2005),  for  example, 
suggest that in 2001, 7% of all workers in EU-15 countries were living in households 
classed as poor, representing a total of 11 million workers.   The recognition of the 
working poor as a distinct group led the European Commission (2003) to include a 
measure of in-work poverty in its list of indicators of social exclusion and a number of 
policy responses including increases in minimum wages and social benefits targeted at 
workers have been proposed. 
A key issue in the discussion of low-wage employment is whether having a 
low-paid job is a persistent or transitory state.  Some workers will experience low pay 
as a random event at some point in their working lives, however for others low-paid 
employment can be a “trap” from which it is  difficult to escape.  This raises the 
question of how we interpret the observation that it is frequently the same workers 
who are observed in low-wage employment in successive time periods.  That is, what 
explains low pay persistence?  Does this imply something about those workers which 
makes them prone to low pay or does the very fact of having experienced low pay 
increase  the  likelihood  of  low  pay  in  the  future?    In  the  language  of  the  applied 
econometrics literature this reflects the distinction between heterogeneity and state 
dependence.    Heterogeneity  refers  to  observable  and  unobservable  differences 
between workers which predispose them to low pay, while state dependence occurs if 
low pay in a particular time period has a directly causal effect on the probability of 
being low paid in the future.  This occurs when there is a depreciation in human   4 
capital or other earnings-enhancing characteristics while in a low-paid job.  Known as 
“scarring”, this is more commonly associated with unemployment spells however it 
may also apply to the experience of low-wage employment.  Furthermore, employers 
may  select  against  those  who  have  a  history  of  low-wage  employment  providing 
another route through which low pay in the past can cause low pay in the present.  
Depending on whether heterogeneity or state dependence is the correct explanation 
for low pay persistence, the policy implications could be quite different. 
Previous econometric studies of low pay persistence have typically examined 
one or two countries and have sought to measure the extent to which workers are 
trapped in low pay as well as to establish the characteristics of those who are likely to 
be found persistently at the lower end of the pay distribution.  Studies generally do 
find systematic differences in the probability of low pay depending on the personal 
and job characteristics of workers.  For example, Sloane and Theodossiou (1998), 
using two waves of panel data from the UK, find that younger, better educated and 
married individuals, as well as those who work for a large firm have a greater chance 
of  escaping  from  low-paid  jobs.    However,  short  tenure  is  found  to  increase  the 
probability  of  remaining  low  paid.    Cappellari  (2000)  argues  that  in  Italy  job 
characteristics such as occupation and firm size rather than individual characteristics 
are the most important factors in explaining low pay persistence. Likewise Asplund et 
al. (1998) examine low wage earners in Denmark and Finland and find that the effect 
of individual characteristics is not as important as the type of occupation. On the 
contrary Stewart and Swaffield (1998) find that in the UK women are more likely to 
be low paid than men  but those working in large firms  and those  who are union 
members are less likely to remain or enter low pay. In common with a number of 
studies, they also find significant persistence in low pay.   5 
In this paper, we extend the evidence base by providing estimates of the nature 
and extent of low pay persistence in a sample of twelve European countries using 
panel data from the period 1994-2001.  As well as documenting the factors associated 
with  low  paid  status  we  estimate  how  far  low  pay  persistence  reflects  true  state 
dependence.  Measures of state dependence are then related to a range of institutional 
features of the European countries to attempt to explain the patterns observed. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  The next section describes the data we use, 
while section 3 discusses the econometric techniques employed.  The estimates of low 
pay persistence are presented in section 4. We then discuss low pay persistence and 
labour market institutions in section 5 and conclude in section 6. 
 
2.  Data and descriptives 
We analyse low pay persistence using data from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), the compilation of which was directed by Eurostat.  The 
ECHP  is  a  standardized,  annual,  longitudinal  survey  providing  information  about 
income, employment, housing, health, human capital and many other social indicators 
for a large and representative sample of households and individuals in the European 
Union. It is the only data set which allows us to investigate, on a consistent basis, the 
nature  and  extent  of  low  pay  persistence  in  European  countries  across  this  time 
period.  When the ECHP started, Eurostat planned a minimum of 1000 households per 
country except for the four largest countries (Germany, UK, France and Italy) and the 
four poorest (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) where the sample would include 
2000  households.  The  first  wave  in  1994  contained  Belgium,  Britain,  Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain.  In  the  second  wave  Austria  was  added,  in  the  third  Finland  and  in  1997   6 
Sweden.  In the current paper we use data for all these countries with the exception of 
Luxembourg where sample sizes are low, and Sweden and Finland, which joined the 
panel relatively late.  Further details about the purpose and quality of ECHP data are 
available in Eurostat (2003a, 2003b, 2004). 
We use data from all available waves of ECHP between 1994 and 2001, thus 
there are eight waves for each country except Austria for which there are seven. The 
analysis is restricted to males aged 18 to 65, who are full-time employees having left 
full-time education and who normally work more than 30 hours per week. Women are 
excluded to avoid issues relating to endogenous female labour supply and the self-
employed  are  not  included  as  their  earnings  are  more  difficult  to  model  due  to 
theoretical issues regarding their constitution.  The unit of analysis is the individual 
worker and the key variable, which is used to construct the low pay indicator, is the 
net hourly wage after deducting any income taxes and social security contributions
1.  
The use of net wages is intended to facilitate international comparisons by abstracting 
from differences between taxation regimes in different countries
2.   Hourly wages are 
constructed by dividing the previous month’s net wages by hours of work.  
Sloane and Theodossiou (1998) note that the lack of a consistent definition of 
low  pay  in  previous  studies  of  earnings  mobility  has  prevented  meaningful 
international comparisons being made.  Some authors (e.g. Stewart and Swaffield, 
1999) have responded to this by comparing different indicators of low pay within the 
same study.  Given the large number of countries in our sample, such an approach 
would be unwieldy hence we have opted to use a single definition of low pay which 
                                                 
1 The exception is France where the available information from Eurostat is on gross wages. 
2 There is no consensus, even between studies focusing on single countries, on what is the appropriate 
measure  of  earnings.    For  example,  Cappellari  (2000,  2002)  uses  net  annual  earnings  for  Italian 
workers while Stewart and Swaffield (1998) use gross hourly earnings for the UK.   7 
we can measure consistently across the twelve countries.  The choice is essentially 
between a fixed threshold or a measure which is relative to the distribution of earnings 
in each country.  Given disparities in income across the countries studied, the latter 
approach is preferred and we classify a worker as being low paid if he earns less than 
two thirds of the mean hourly earnings in each country and year
3.   
Table 1 presents some preliminary evidence on the distribution of low pay 
across European countries and its persistence over time.  The probability of being low 
paid (column 1) varies between 0.065 (Belgium) and 0.194 (Portugal).  As well as 
Portugal, more than 15% of male workers are estimated to be low paid in France, 
Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK.  However, these are raw probabilities, which do 
not take into account the status of the worker in the previous time period.  Conditional 
probabilities of being low paid are presented in the next three columns. Column 2 
shows the probabilities of remaining in low pay and these are much higher than the 
unconditional probabilities in column 1 as well as the probability of entering low pay, 
which is given in column 3. In particular the probability of a worker staying low paid 
between two successive years varies between 0.387 and 0.650, while for those who 
are not low paid the inflow probability is never greater than 0.071.  Furthermore the 
ranking of the probabilities of staying in low pay is broadly similar to the ranking of 
the raw low pay probabilities – in other words, countries with relatively large numbers 
of workers in low pay are also those where it is hardest to get out of low pay.  The last 
two columns formalise this idea by presenting two descriptive measures of low pay 
persistence. The first shows how much more likely (in terms of “probability points”) 
those in low pay are to stay in low pay than those out of low pay are to enter low pay, 
                                                 
3 We experimented with other measures of low pay based on the median of the earnings distribution.  
Full details are available on request.   8 
while the last column shows how many times more likely it is for those in low pay to 
remain in low pay than for other workers to enter. Both measures demonstrate that 
workers who were low paid in period t are much more likely to be low paid in t + 1 
than those who were not low paid in t.  Thus, on the basis of the raw data there 
appears to be strong persistence in low pay across these twelve European countries.  
Finally,  column  4  presents  information  about  the  outflow  from  low  pay.  This 
probability is also high but it is smaller for countries with high persistence in low 
pay
4. All these measures suggest that there is strong persistence in low pay and the 
question  is  how  much  of  it  is  due  to  workers’  (either  observed  or  unobserved) 
characteristics or stems from true state dependence.  
< Table 1 near here > 
To provide some preliminary evidence on how low pay status is distributed 
across workers, Table 2 shows the probability of being low paid in each country for 
workers with given characteristics.  Unsurprisingly, better educated and older workers 
are  less  likely  to  be  low  paid.  There  is  however  less  of  a  clear  pattern  regarding 
whether  post-education  training  reduces  the  likelihood  of  being  low  paid.  
Agricultural and public sector workers are more likely to be low paid than workers in 
other sectors and occupations.  One of the starkest contrasts in the Table 2 is between 
those on permanent and non-permanent contracts, with the latter having considerably 
higher rates of low pay. 
 
< Table 2 near here > 
 
3.  Econometric analysis 
                                                 
4 This is expected because  ( ) ( ) 1 1 Pr 1| 1 1 Pr 0| 1 t t t t LP LP LP LP - - = = = - = = .   9 
Identifying  true  state  dependence,  as  opposed  to  heterogeneity,  suggests  a 
modelling approach which incorporates both unobservable and observable influences 
on low paid status.  Since being low paid or not is a discrete dependent variable, the 
dynamic random effects probit framework represented by equation (1) below is the 
most appropriate
5.   
 
* '
1 it it it i it L L x u g b e - = + + +   (1) 
 
The subscript  1,2, , i N = …  denotes individuals that are included in our sample 
and the subscript  2,3, , t T = …  represents the time periods for which the model is 
estimated.  it L  is a dummy variable for being low paid which is equal to one when 
*
it L , 
a latent measure of low-paid status, exceeds some threshold.  The vector  it x  contains 
(assumed) strictly exogenous explanatory variables. Obviously  1 it L -  is the low pay 
status of individual i in the previous year.  The random error term in this model is 
composed of two terms.  The individual-specific error terms  i e , captures unobserved 
heterogeneity  which  differs  between  individuals  but  remains  constant  for  each 
examined individual, while  it u  is the “usual” error term with the properties that it is 
zero mean, uncorrelated with itself, uncorrelated with  it x , uncorrelated with  i e  and 
homoscedastic.   
                                                 
5  The  choice  of  random  effects  comes  from  the  fact  that  in  non-linear  models  fixed  effects  are 
problematic. MLE estimator is inconsistent in probit models with fixed effects because it suffers from 
incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948). Chamberlain (1980) proposed a conditional 
static logit model and later Chamberlain (1984) a dynamic one under the restriction that observable 
heterogeneity  stays  time-invariant.  Later  Honore  and  Kyriazidou  (2000)  proposed  a  conditional 
dynamic  logit  model  which  requires  very  strong  distributional  assumptions  about  the  observable 
heterogeneity over time and has a rate of convergence slower than  N .   10 
The assumption that  i e  is uncorrelated with  it x  for all  i and in every  t is 
frequently thought of as unrealistic thus following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain 
(1984) we specify a relationship between the unobserved heterogeneity  i e  and the 
means  (within  i,  over  T)  of  all  time-varying  explanatory  variables.  This  implies 
that
'
i i i x e d a = +  and with the assumption that  ( )    0,1 i iid N a ∼  and is independent of 
it x  and  it u  for all  i and in all  t periods, this leads to a correlated random effects 
probit model, with extra regressors which are the means of all time-varying variables. 
Substituting into (1) we get: 
 
* ' '
1 it it it i i it L L x x u g b d a - = + + + +    (2) 
 
Estimation of this model using Gauss-Hermite quadrature is straightforward 
however the resulting parameter estimates are only consistent if we are prepared to 
make  a  further  assumption.    This  involves  whether  the  initial  observation  of  the 
dependent variable  1 i L  and the unobserved heterogeneity  i e  are correlated or not.  
This “initial conditions problem” arises when the beginning of the estimation period 
does not coincide with the beginning of the stochastic process which generates low 
pay status. Consider the following data generation process.  For periods after the first 
period from (2),  
* ' '
1 it it it i i it L L x x u g b d a - = + + + +  for  2,..., t T =  
while for the initial period we have: 
* '
1 1 i i i L x l h = +    11 
Notice  that  no  information  regarding  0 i L   is  available.  If  i h   and  i a   are 
correlated then 
*
1 i L  is correlated with  i a  in 
* ' '
2 1 2 2 i i i i i i L L x x u g b d a = + + + +  and γ and 
β can not be estimated consistently.  
A general solution to this is to jointly estimate the random effects probit for 
1 t >  and the probit for  1 t = .  This is the approach taken by Heckman (1981a, 1981b), 
who specifies a reduced form equation for the initial observation: 
 
* '
1 i i i L z l h = +   (3) 
 
where  i z  is a vector of strictly exogenous variables, which affect 
*
1 i L ,  ( )
2 var i h h s =  
and  ( ) , i i corr a h r = .  To ensure identification of the system of equations described 
by equations (2) and (3)  i z  is a superset of xi and includes instruments which affect 
only the probability of being low paid in the first period.  Presample information, 
which is assumed to influence 
*
1 i L  can be included in  i z  as well as the vector of 
means i x .  To allow for a non-zero  r , a linear specification is introduced, in terms of 
orthogonal error components: 
  1 i i i u h qa = +   (4) 
 
By  construction  i a   and  i u   are  orthogonal  to  one  another  with  / h a q rs s =   and 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 var 1 i u h s r = - . Furthermore, it is assumed that the initial observation of  L is 
not correlated with  it u , i.e.  ( ) 1 , 0 it i u L E =  and also it is not correlated with  it x  for all i 
and in all  2, , t T = … . 
If now equation (4) is replaced into equation (3) equation (5) emerges 
 
* '
1 1 i i i i L z u l qa = + +   (5)   12 
 
which in combination with equation (2) constitute the following full specification of 






                                                                             
,    1,2, ,    and    2, ,
i i i i
it it it i i it
L z u
L L x x u i N t T
l qa
g b d a -
  = + + 
 
= + + + + = =    … …
  (6) 
 
According to Heckman (1981a) and Heckman (1981b) under the assumption 
that  ( )
2 0, i IN a a s ∼ , is independent of  it u  and that the distribution of 
*
it L  conditional 
on  i a ,  it x  and  1 it L -  is independent normal this model can be estimated by maximum 
likelihood, however it is computationally time-consuming and the procedure is not 
guaranteed to converge.     
Orme (1996) suggests a two-step estimation method, which is easy to estimate 
using standard random effects probit software.
6  Orme follows Heckman by assuming 
that the model is fully specified by equations (2) and (3).  He then suggests a linear 
specification,  in  terms  of  orthogonal  error  components  in  such  a  way  that  again 
0 r ¹ : 
  i i i w a kh = +   (7) 
 
By construction  i h  and  i w  are orthogonal to each other,  / a h k rs s =  and 
( ) ( )
2 2 var 1 a k s r = - . 
The next step is to substitute (7) into (2) and get: 
 
* '
1 i it it it i i it L x L x w u b g d kh - = + + + + +   (8) 
 
                                                 
6 An alternative, simple estimator is also provided by Wooldridge (2005).   13 
where  1,2, , i n = …  and  2, , t T = … . 
In this “new” random effects probit, there are two individual specific random 
effects,  i h  and  i w  and the assumption of bivariate normality of  ( ) , i i h a  implies that 


















  F -  
 by construction.  
  Since  it u  is assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors,  i w  can be treated as 
the common error component in a random effects probit, as long as we take care of 
the unobservable  i h . Taking into consideration that  i e  is derived from a probit model 
from equation (3)
7, it is reasonable to substitute  i h  by its  conditional expectation 
( ) 1 | i i i E L e h = .  Thus,  equation  (8)  becomes  a  random-effects  probit  with  an  extra 
regressor  i e  which can easily be generated from the parameter estimates from the first 
stage  probit  model:  ( ) ( ) ( )
' '
1 1 ˆ ˆ 2 1 2 1 i i i i i e L z L z   = - F -   f l l .  A  test  of  the  null 
hypothesis that  0 r =  can be obtained by a simple t-test on the coefficient on  i e .   
  Orme  (1996)  and  Arulampalam  and  Stewart  (forthcoming)  provide  Monte  
Carlo evidence which suggests that Orme’s approach can provide estimates which are 
no  worse  than  the  Heckman  procedure,  but  at  a  much  lower  cost  in  terms  of 
computation time, so long as T ≥ 6 and N ≥ 800.
8  These criteria are met in our 
empirical implementation and in what follows we report results computed using the 
procedure proposed by Orme (1996). 
                                                 
7 Remember that  ( ) 1 | i i i E L e h =  
8  All the estimations were carried out using Stata version 8.2/IC (StataCorp (2003)). Estimation of the 
Orme model took between one and four minutes. Wooldridge’s (2005) estimator was slower taking 
from  three  to  eleven  minutes  while  the  Heckman  estimator  itself  was  substantially  more  time-
consuming with convergence times between two to ten hours.   14 
  
4.  Empirical results 
4.1.  Impact of explanatory variables 
The estimates of the model using the Orme procedure are contained in Tables 
3 and 4.  Before discussing the main parameter of interest, γ, which measures the 
extent of low pay persistence in each country we briefly consider the estimates of the 
other parameters in the model, those relating to the explanatory variables.  These are 
shown in Table 3 and are derived from the second stage of the Orme procedure, i.e. 
equation (8).  In the first stage equation, we included additional regressors denoting 
whether the individual was unemployed during the last five years before joining the 
survey and two variables indicating whether his most frequent activity a year before 
joining the survey was employed or unemployed.  Such pre-sample information is 
intended to identify the extent of true state dependence by proxying the stochastic 
process  determining  low  pay  prior  to  the  initial  observations  of  low  paid  status.  
Results from the first stage are not reported here, but are available on request. 
< Table 3 near here > 
  Table 3 contains marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of being low paid
9.  The signs of these are generally in line with what one 
would expect according to human capital theory, and the huge empirical literature on 
earnings  functions.    Having  a  larger  endowment  of  formal  education  reduces  the 
probability of low pay.  For example, having completed university level education is 
both economically and statistically significant in every country with marginal effects 
                                                 
9 There is a slight complication in interpretation of marginal effects in a two stage model like this 
which arises  from the fact that the  initial conditions correction terms ei above is also affected by 
marginal  changes  in  the  explanatory  variables.    The  marginal  effects  presented  here  are  thus  best 
interpreted as conditional on the values of the explanatory variables in the initial period, T=1.     15 
ranging from -0.016 in Belgium to -0.095 in Portugal.  Further training, defined as 
any form of vocational or training course other than general or higher education, also 
reduces  the  probability  of  being  low  paid  in  the  majority  of  countries  and  is 
statistically significant at 10% or lower in five of them.  With the sole exception of 
Germany,  older  workers  are  generally  less  likely  to  be  found  in  low  pay,  while 
marriage has a negative and significant marginal effect in six of the twelve countries. 
As  well  as  these  individual  variables,  job-related  characteristics  are  also 
included in model.  Of these, the strongest finding is for type of work contract where 
those  on  permanent  contracts  have  a  lower  probability  of  being  low  paid.    The 
magnitude of this effect ranges from a reduction of 0.073 in France to a reduction of 
0.012 in Belgium and it is statistically significant in every country except Belgium.  
Working in the public sector is significant only for Denmark, France, Italy and the 
UK and in all cases its marginal effect is positive.  Wherever working in supervisory 
position is significant, it reduces the likelihood of low pay. 
 
4.2.  Initial conditions and state dependence 
Turning now to the issue of state dependence, the key estimation problem is 
the potential endogeneity of the intitial conditions.  The Orme procedure allows a 
simple test of the null hypothesis of endogeneity, which is a test of the significance of 
the “correction” variable ei.  The estimates of the parameter on this variable together 
with its estimated standard error are presented in Table 3 in the row labelled “Initial 
Conditions”.  Clearly this term is highly significant (at 1% or lower) for each of the   16 
countries.  The effect that controlling for initial conditions has on the estimates of the 
magnitude of state dependence will be discussed below.
10 
The  estimates  of  the  marginal  effect  associated  with  the  parameter  γ  are 
presented in the first row of Table 3.
 11  We call this the dynamic marginal effect and 
we argue that this measures true state dependence in low pay. It is clear that, after 
controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, and for each of the countries 
in our sample, being low paid in period t-1 has a positive and statistically significant 
effect  on  the  probability  of  being  low  paid  in  period  t.    There  is  therefore  state 
dependence  in  low  pay  in  these  European  countries.    The  magnitude  of  this  lies 
between 0.066 and 0.237 with marginal effects of greater than 0.1 in 7 of the twelve 
countries (France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK)
12. 
Table 4 provides further information on the extent of state dependence.  The 
marginal effects from the first row of Table 3 are reproduced in the fourth column 
while the first three columns contain other measures of the same parameter.  These 
are, respectively the probability of remaining in low pay from the raw data (column 5 
of table 1), an estimate of the marginal effect calculated from the coefficient on a 
lagged dependent variable in a pooled probit model (equation (1) without the εi term), 
and  the  estimate  of  the  same  parameter  from  a  dynamic  random  effects  probit 
(equation (1)).  Thus, moving across the columns from left to right in Table 4, we 
                                                 
10  To  our  knowledge  this  estimator  has  not  been  used  before  to  model  persistence  in  low  pay. 
Arulampalam et. al (2000) used the Orme approach to estimate unemployment persistence in the UK. 
11 This is the effect of low pay status last period on the probability of being low paid in period t and is 
given by: Pr(Lit = 1 | Lit-1 = 1) – Pr(Lit = 1 | Lit= 0).  We have computed this taking account of the issues 
raised in Wooldridge (2005) and Arulampalam (1999). 
12  To  confirm  the  robustness  of  our  results  we  also  estimated  a  dynamic  random  effects  probit 
controlling for the initial conditions, using the methodology suggested by Wooldridge (2005). The 
results were very similar with the dynamic marginal effects lying between 0.046 and 0.226 and with 4 
out of 12 countries reporting a value greater than 0.1 (France, Ireland, Portugal and the UK).   17 
control  for  observed  heterogeneity  (column  (1)  to  column  (2)),  observed  and 
unobserved  heterogeneity  (column  (3))  and  finally  heterogeneity  plus  initial 
conditions (column 4).   
< Table 4 near here> 
It is clear that as we move from left to right the estimated extent of low pay 
persistence declines as we control for progressively more factors.  Between columns 
(1) and (2), which could be thought of as controlling for observables, the reduction in 
the average measure of persistence is 29%, controlling for unobservables reduces the 
raw level a further 18% while taking account of initial conditions leads to another 
reduction of 29% of the initial estimate.  Overall, the extent of low pay persistence 
estimated using the Orme model is 76% lower on average than that from the raw data.  
Controlling for heterogeneity and initial conditions is thus extremely important when 
trying to establish the level of true state dependence in low pay, and the effect of each 
of these factors varies by country.  However there remains a fairly strong positive 
correlation between the various measures, as the scatter matrix in Figure 1 shows.  
The  lowest  correlation  in  these  graphs  is  r  =  0.72  (p  =  0.01)  for  the  relationship 
between the final (Orme) estimates and the pooled probit.  The correlation between 
the estimates from the raw data and the final estimates is r = 0.81 (p = 0.00).   In other 
words, countries which score highly on the raw measure of persistence also tend to be 
those where true state dependence is estimated to be high.   
< Figure 1 near here > 
  To put these results in context it would useful to compare our results with 
those  from  other  researchers.    However,  as  previously  noted,  studies  of  low  pay 
persistence have used different definitions of low pay and different methodologies and 
this should be borne in mind.    It is however worth noting that both Stewart and   18 
Swaffield (1999) for the UK and Cappellari (2000 and 2002) for Italy find a much 
higher  proportion  of  the  raw  low  pay  persistence  to  be  due  to  genuine  state 
dependence. 
 
5.  Further discussion 
 
In  the  previous  section  we  have  demonstrated  the  existence  of  positive, 
statistically  significant  state  dependence  in  low  pay  in  a  sample  of  European 
countries.  It is interesting to speculate about the variation in the magnitude of this 
effect.  For example, Portugal is the country with the strongest low pay persistence 
which could be related to the fact that Portugal is a highly regulated labour market 
characterized by high strictness of employment protection legislation which works as 
a safeguard for those in employment, (OECD, 1997). Even though the Portuguese and 
other  Mediterranean  labour  markets  are  not  characterized  by  high  levels  of  union 
density their segmented labour markets might work as a safeguard for the workers in 
the internal labour markets. Comparing Portugal with the other Southern European 
Union countries (Greece, Italy, Spain) it seems that Portuguese economy is much less 
“mobile”  than  the  other  Mediterranean  economies.  Among  these  countries  Spain 
displays the lowest persistence while Greece has the highest. 
On  the  other  hand  Denmark  is,  almost  in  all  cases,  the  country  with  the 
smallest dynamic marginal effect, suggesting that low pay persistence is minimal and 
Danish workers are not trapped into low wages. In this context it is worth noting that 
Denmark is a country with higher participation and employment rates in Europe and 
also during the period studied here Denmark recorded very low unemployment rates. 
This is mainly a result of a combination of modest employment protection legislation   19 
with a social security net that efficiently helps the Danish unemployed. Denmark is an 
excellent  example  of  a  labour  market  characterized  by  “flexicurity”,  which 
successfully combines high job mobility, high flexibility in the labour market and 
high unemployment benefits. 
Two countries with relatively high dynamic marginal effect are France and 
Germany  which  are  also  economies  with  regulated  labour  markets.  Moreover,  for 
Germany  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  there  is  high  union  density  and  very  strict 
compliance with the collective bargaining. On the other hand in France the high levels 
of minimum wage might increase low pay persistence.  
An  interesting  finding  is  that  UK  and  Ireland  turn  out  in  most  cases  with 
higher  than  the  overall  average  low  pay  persistence.  These  two  economies  were 
expected more flexible because of relatively low levels of employment regulations. 
As  there  is  relatively  low  public  interference  and  weak  employment  protection 
legislation  it  might  be  expected  that  for  these  g   would  be  lower  than  in  other 
countries. However, they show a rather high “degree of immobility” as it is measured 
by  g . More specifically UK and Ireland have a higher  g  than the Mediterranean 
countries and the “continental” countries.  
To consider these ideas a little more formally, Figure 2 presents the results of 
correlating the dynamic marginal effect from each country with various measures of 
labour market institutions.  Institutional aspects of developed country labour markets 
have been seen by researchers as important determinants of labour market outcomes 
such  as  employment  and  unemployment  rates  (see,  for  example,  Blanchard  and 
Wolfers, 2000 or Belot and Van Ours, 2004). 
< Figure 2 near here >   20 
The data on institutions are taken from Bassanini and Duval (2006) and the 
institutional variables are briefly defined in the appendix.
13  Figure 2 suggests that low 
pay persistence is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate, replacement rate, 
tax wedge, union density and coverage and active labour market programmes, while 
positive correlations exist for employment protection and product market regulation.  
It should be noted however that some of these correlations, both positive and negative, 
are very low, and only the tax wedge is statistically significant at conventional levels.  
In standard models of unemployment (for  example, the wage-setting, price-setting 
model) the tax wedge is thought to increase equilibrium unemployment, however it is 
less  clear  how,  from  a  theoretical  perspective,  persistence  in  low  pay  would  be 
affected by the wedge.  Indeed, the overall impression from Figure 2 is of no clear or 
simple  explanation  of  how  the  magnitude  of  state  dependence  in  low  pay  varies 
between countries.   
 
6.  Conclusions 
In conclusion, using the European Community Household Panel data we have 
demonstrated the existence of positive, statistically significant state dependence in 
low  pay  in  a  sample  of  twelve  European  countries.    Our  results  suggest  that 
heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, explains a substantial majority of the 
overall tendency for outflows from low pay to be relatively small. However, a role for 
true state dependence – the idea that being low paid permanently affects the future 
likelihood of exiting low pay – remains.  To the extent that persistence in low pay is 
not the result of genuine state dependence but reflects differences between workers in 
productive  abilities,  there  is  scope  for  policy  to  enhance  human  capital  to  free 
                                                 
13 Greece is excluded from this analysis as no institutional data were available.   21 
European workers from the low pay trap.  Regarding true state dependence, there is 
substantial variation between European countries. The explanation of this variation 
requires further theoretical and empirical work.   22 
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Fig. 1. Scatter matrix of persistence measures. Note: See Table 4 and the text for definitions of the 
alternative measures of low pay persistence. The countries featured are: Austria (AUT), Belgium 
(BEL), Denmark (DNK), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRE), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), 










































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. Low pay persistence and institutions. Note: Persistence is measured here by the estimated 
dynamic marginal effect from the Orme model. For definition of other variables used see Appendix. 
Country acronyms are defines in the notes to Fig. 1. 
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Table 1 
Transition Probabilities of Low Pay 


















Austria  0.084  0.471  0.021  0.529  0.450  22.327 
Belgium  0.065  0.387  0.031  0.613  0.357  12.654 
Denmark  0.080  0.492  0.025  0.508  0.467  19.618 
France  0.166  0.561  0.053  0.439  0.508  10.599 
Germany  0.131  0.620  0.044  0.380  0.576  13.971 
Greece  0.160  0.550  0.060  0.450  0.490  9.106 
Ireland  0.189  0.615  0.042  0.385  0.573  14.599 
Italy  0.074  0.473  0.026  0.527  0.446  17.970 
Netherlands  0.095  0.553  0.029  0.448  0.524  19.118 
Portugal  0.194  0.650  0.058  0.350  0.592  11.242 
Spain  0.188  0.515  0.074  0.485  0.441  6.962 
UK  0.155  0.555  0.056  0.445  0.499  9.905 
Note: The table reports: 1. Probability of being low paid, 2. Probability of being low paid in year t 
conditional on being low paid in year t-1, 3. Inflow to low pay, i.e. probability of being low paid in 
year t conditional on not being low paid in year t-1, 4. Outflow of low pay, i.e. probability of not being 
low paid in year t conditional on being low paid in year t-1 
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Table 2 
Low Pay Probabilities by characteristics 
  Austria  Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  Greece 
University  0.026  0.041  0.024  0.080  0.081  0.056 
High school  0.062  0.069  0.075  0.157  0.147  0.168 
Primary school  0.207  0.083  0.179  0.195  0.144  0.214 
Age 18-24  0.237  0.234  0.449  0.571  0.391  0.503 
Age 25-34  0.062  0.090  0.056  0.204  0.129  0.204 
Age35-44  0.060  0.048  0.042  0.104  0.110  0.083 
Age 45 +  0.047  0.034  0.026  0.084  0.098  0.078 
Married  0.048  0.042  0.031  0.093  0.095  0.087 
Not Married  0.137  0.119  0.143  0.286  0.212  0.318 
Training  0.054  0.047  0.090  0.157  0.393  0.071 
Not Training  0.090  0.067  0.071  0.166  0.121  0.164 
Agriculture  0.370  0.139  0.190  0.430  0.423  0.396 
Industry  0.076  0.062  0.069  0.155  0.106  0.188 
Services  0.080  0.070  0.073  0.164  0.139  0.135 
Public  0.098  0.080  0.086  0.196  0.141  0.228 
Private  0.044  0.048  0.063  0.085  0.097  0.047 
Permanent Contract  0.060  0.053  0.038  0.124  0.114  0.108 
Temporary Contract  0.161  0.120  0.146  0.422  0.254  0.344 
 
  Ireland  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  UK 
University  0.089  0.023  0.030  0.015  0.075  0.104 
High school  0.200  0.051  0.080  0.103  0.169  0.168 
Primary school  0.202  0.100  0.117  0.223  0.249  0.222 
Age 18-24  0.486  0.258  0.661  0.396  0.478  0.450 
Age 25-34  0.169  0.094  0.118  0.164  0.218  0.137 
Age35-44  0.079  0.035  0.040  0.127  0.123  0.076 
Age 45 +  0.059  0.039  0.037  0.157  0.106  0.102 
Married  0.057  0.042  0.042  0.138  0.131  0.087 
Not Married  0.365  0.145  0.219  0.302  0.307  0.246 
Training  0.246  0.035  0.206  0.079  0.128  0.097 
Not Training  0.181  0.076  0.087  0.197  0.196  0.180 
Agriculture  0.624  0.246  0.301  0.570  0.535  0.383 
Industry  0.184  0.073  0.104  0.193  0.166  0.128 
Services  0.156  0.056  0.085  0.142  0.173  0.172 
Public  0.247  0.094  0.110  0.228  0.222  0.175 
Private  0.046  0.035  0.046  0.075  0.075  0.062 
Permanent Contract  0.132  0.046  0.071  0.159  0.104  0.142 
Temporary Contract  0.352  0.234  0.336  0.331  0.343  0.366 
Note: Low Pay probabilities conditional on level of education, age, marital status, post education 
training, industry and sector of employment and type of employment contract. 
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Table 3 
Low Pay Probability model – Orme Estimator 
  Austria  Belgium  Denmark  France  Germany  Greece 
             
Low Paid t-1  0.087***  0.075***  0.066***  0.149***  0.134***  0.121*** 
  [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.022]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.016] 
Initial Conditions  0.031***  0.028***  0.024***  0.057***  0.094***  0.038*** 
  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
University  -0.033***  -0.016**  -0.025***  -0.071***  -0.046***  -0.058*** 
  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.013]  [0.009] 
High School  -0.026***  0.005  -0.007  -0.003  0.023**  -0.023*** 
  [0.008]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.011]  [0.008] 
Training  -0.011*  -0.014**  0.005  0.018  0.030  -0.032* 
  [0.006]  [0.007]  [0.004]  [0.011]  [0.025]  [0.019] 
Age 25-34  -0.006  -0.007  -0.014*  -0.046***  -0.040***  -0.069*** 
  [0.007]  [0.013]  [0.007]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.010] 
Age 35-44  0.003  -0.016  -0.006  -0.075***  -0.006  -0.087*** 
  [0.009]  [0.014]  [0.009]  [0.014]  [0.015]  [0.012] 
Age 45+  -0.009  -0.033***  -0.018**  -0.086***  0.035**  -0.091*** 
  [0.009]  [0.012]  [0.009]  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.012] 
Public Sector  0.004  0.003  0.021*  0.040*  0.019  0.021 
  [0.016]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.024]  [0.017]  [0.019] 
Permanent Contract  -0.045***  -0.012  -0.018**  -0.073***  -0.021*  -0.046*** 
  [0.012]  [0.011]  [0.009]  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.009] 
Supervisory  0.008  0.001  -0.008  -0.024*    -0.051** 
  [0.013]  [0.014]  [0.008]  [0.013]    [0.023] 
Intermediate  -0.004  -0.004  -0.002  -0.007    0.041* 
  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.009]    [0.024] 
Industry  -0.064*  0.007  -0.010  0.116*  -0.109***  -0.004 
  [0.039]  [0.036]  [0.026]  [0.064]  [0.038]  [0.051] 
Services  -0.043  0.030  0.011  0.103*  -0.089***  0.018 
  [0.034]  [0.034]  [0.027]  [0.054]  [0.034]  [0.052] 
Married  0.003  -0.006  -0.000  -0.042**  -0.025  -0.039 
  [0.016]  [0.019]  [0.010]  [0.018]  [0.017]  [0.026] 
             
LogL.  -999.79  -752.50  -697.40  -2360.53  -2768.81  -1906.41 
N  7961  5274  6441  10787  10269  8056 
(continued on next page)   30 
 Table 3 (continued) 
  Ireland  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  Spain  UK 
             
Low Paid t-1  0.180***  0.092***  0.111***  0.237***  0.089***  0.142*** 
  [0.023]  [0.016]  [0.021]  [0.016]  [0.010]  [0.016] 
Initial Conditions  0.041***  0.022***  0.034***  0.062***  0.058***  0.057*** 
  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.005]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
University  -0.051***  -0.018***  -0.021***  -0.095***  -0.069***  -0.054*** 
  [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.006]  [0.017]  [0.007]  [0.007] 
High School  -0.027***  -0.019***  -0.008**  -0.056***  -0.044***  -0.033*** 
  [0.007]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.009]  [0.006]  [0.007] 
Training  -0.004  -0.006  -0.003  0.012  -0.034***  -0.023*** 
  [0.011]  [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.028]  [0.009]  [0.006] 
Age 25-34  -0.020**  -0.016***  -0.045***  -0.041***  -0.040***  -0.065*** 
  [0.009]  [0.005]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Age 35-44  -0.022*  -0.029***  -0.071***  -0.043***  -0.075***  -0.076*** 
  [0.012]  [0.005]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.008] 
Age 45+  -0.024*  -0.028***  -0.072***  -0.044***  -0.089***  -0.059*** 
  [0.013]  [0.006]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Public Sector  0.013  0.014**  0.015  0.021  0.003  0.070*** 
  [0.024]  [0.007]  [0.009]  [0.015]  [0.017]  [0.014] 
Perm. Contract  -0.021*  -0.032***  -0.032***  -0.038***  -0.053***  -0.068*** 
  [0.011]  [0.006]  [0.009]  [0.008]  [0.006]  [0.016] 
Supervisory  -0.003  -0.008  -0.017**  0.011  -0.022  -0.038*** 
  [0.018]  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.034]  [0.016]  [0.011] 
Intermediate  0.002  -0.008  -0.008  0.006  -0.005  -0.025*** 
  [0.013]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.021]  [0.009]  [0.009] 
Industry  -0.073**  -0.017  0.023  -0.042*  -0.032  -0.051* 
  [0.031]  [0.013]  [0.028]  [0.024]  [0.020]  [0.029] 
Services  -0.069**  -0.008  0.002  -0.028  -0.010  -0.020 
  [0.032]  [0.013]  [0.024]  [0.024]  [0.020]  [0.032] 
Married  -0.022  -0.021*  -0.031**  -0.081***  -0.034**  -0.038** 
  [0.025]  [0.011]  [0.013]  [0.016]  [0.017]  [0.015] 
             
LogL.  -1440.90  -1814.19  -1643.26  -3578.31  -4042.66  -2939.53 
N  7028  15858  12009  13626  14801  12054 
Note: The table reports marginal effects from the Orme model; for estimation methods see text. 
Standard errors are in brackets. All models also contain averages of time varying variables and year 
dummies (not reported for brevity). LogL and sample sizes refer to periods 2 to T. * p-value less 
than 0.10, ** p-value less than 0.05, *** p-value less than 0.01   31 
Table 4 
Dynamic Marginal Effects of Previous Low Pay – Alternative Estimators 










0.450  0.372  0.227  0.087 
Belgium 
 
0.357  0.273  0.177  0.075 
Denmark 
 
0.467  0.268  0.154  0.066 
France 
 
0.508  0.361  0.265  0.149 
Germany 
 
0.576  0.542  0.319  0.134 
Greece 
 
0.490  0.277  0.192  0.121 
Ireland 
 
0.573  0.395  0.298  0.180 
Italy 
 
0.446  0.276  0.275  0.092 
Netherlands 
 
0.524  0.351  0.346  0.111 
Portugal 
 
0.592  0.507  0.389  0.237 
Spain 
 
0.441  0.275  0.168  0.089 
UK 
 
0.499  0.361  0.346  0.142 
Note: All Dynamic Marginal Effects are significant at 1%. For estimation methods see text.   32 
Appendix A 
 
Definition of variables 
Variable  Definition 
Low Pay  =  1 if low paid in current year, =  0 otherwise 
University  =  1 if highest level of education completed university, =  0 otherwise 
High School  =  1 if highest level of education completed high-school, =  0 otherwise 
  (Base category  =  no qualifications or highest level of education is primary) 
Training  =  1 if training course was undertaken the last year, =  0 otherwise 
Age 25-34  =  1 if aged 25-34 years, =  0 otherwise 
Age 35-44  =  1 if aged 35-44 years, =  0 otherwise 
Age 45-65  =  1 if aged 45-65 years, =  0 otherwise 
  (Base category  =  aged 18-24 years) 
Public  =  1 if current job is in the public sector, =  0 otherwise 
Permanent 
Employment  =  1 if holds a permanent employment contract, =  0 otherwise 
Supervisory  =  1 if current job’s status is supervisory, =  0 otherwise 
Intermediate  =  1 if current job’s status is intermediate, =  0 otherwise 
  (Base category  =  non-supervisory) 
Unemployed 5 
years ago  =  1 if unemployed within the last five years, =  0 otherwise 
Last employed  =  1 if employed one year ago, =  0 otherwise 
Last unemployed  =  1 if unemployed one year ago, =  0 otherwise 
  (Base category  =  inactive one year ago) 
Industry  =  1 if current job is in the industry sector, =  0 otherwise 
Services  =  1 if current job is in the services sector, =  0 otherwise 
  (Base category  = agricultural sector) 
Married  =  1 if married, =  0 otherwise 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Unemployed workers as share of the labour force 
Replacement Rate  Average unemployment benefit replacement rate across different income situations, family 
situations and unemployment durations 
Tax Wedge  The sum of personal income tax and all social security contributions as a percentage of 
total labour cost. 
Union Density  The share of workers affiliated to a trade union, in %. 
Union Coverage  The share of workers covered by a collective agreement, in %. 
Employment 
Protection 
OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation. 
Regulation  OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market competition in 
seven non-manufacturing industries. 
ALMP  Public expenditures on active labour market programmes per unemployed worker as a 
share of GDP per capita (or public expenditures on active labour market programmes as a 
share of GDP, depending on econometric specifications), in %. 
 
 
 
 